Sexually Explicit Internet Sites and Emails in the Workplace: A Discussion of Cases, Arguments, and Recommendations
Amy J. McKee
Labor Relations Representative
Labor Relations Bureau
Department of Employee Relations
State of Minnesota
September 20, 2000
Introduction
1.
How
is the State as an employer disciplining employees who are either viewing
sexually explicit Internet sites or sending sexually explicit emails
while on State time and/or using State equipment and systems?
2.
How
are private sector employers and other governmental entities disciplining
employees for this type of misconduct?
3.
What
right does the State as an employer have to monitor employees’ email
and Internet usage?
4.
What
types of defenses or arguments might the unions proffer in response
to the discipline?
5.
What
other types of related issues may develop in the future?
6.
What,
if anything, should the State be doing to modify or enhance its existing
policies and procedures?
With these questions
in mind, the Bureau began an extensive research project, the results
of which are presented below.
Question One – Current/Previous Disciplinary Actions
by the State
The Bureau does not currently have any cases (a case that
have been appealed to arbitration) involving this type of misconduct. The Bureau is, however, aware that some agencies
have recently disciplined employees for similar infractions; however,
those cases have not yet been appealed to arbitration.
The Bureau has also gone to arbitration on two (2) cases
involving this type of misconduct. Those
two (2) cases are summarized below for the reader’s convenience.
1.
In the
case of the State of Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry and
MAPE, BMS Case #9801.10, a long term employee was discharged for
accessing both sexually explicit (i.e., pornographic) and other non-work
related (i.e., gardening) Internet sites, and for inappropriately accessing
the Internet. Arbitrator Jay Fogelberg ruled that, although
it was undisputed that the grievant committed the charged violations,
discharge was too severe of a penalty, finding that the misconduct was
not so egregious as to justify bypassing the progressive discipline
process. Also, the grievant's prior satisfactory work record served
to further mitigate the necessary discipline. The grievant was reinstated,
without six (6) months of backpay.
2.
In the
case of the State of Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and
AFSCME, BMS Case #10001.9, the grievant was discharged for accessing
more than one-thousand (1000) obscene/pornographic sites and other non-business
related sites during work hours over a five (5) day period. The grievant had previously received two (2)
oral warnings for unrelated incidents. Arbitrator John J. Prior found that, while the evidence established
that the grievant accessed improper Internet sites, discharge was too
severe of a penalty in this situation. Arbitrator Prior agreed with
the union argument that the employer's imposition of discipline for
violations of "zero-tolerance" policies may have lacked consistency.
The discharge was reduced to a three (3) day suspension. Backpay was
awarded for the reinstatement less the three (3) days.
Further research
revealed that the vast majority of State employees who are disciplined
for this type of misconduct frequently did not fully avail themselves
of the grievance procedures provided for in the contracts. For example, the Bureau is aware of twenty (20) State cases where
an employees were discharged for accessing sexually explicit websites
and the employees have not pursued arbitration or other litigation. The breakdown for those twenty (20) cases is as follows:
1.
In
two (2) of the cases, the union grieved the employee’s discharge. In one (1) of those cases, the union withdrew
and the other case settled by permitting the grievant to resign in lieu
of termination;
2.
The
employer allowed voluntary resignation in lieu of termination in six
(6) of the cases;
3.
The
employer non-certified the employee in two (2) of the cases;
4.
In
nine (9) of the cases, the discharged employee took no action; and
5.
In
only one (1) case the employer issued a three- (3) day suspension for
one (1) incident of forwarding a sexually explicit email. The union did grieve the suspension but later withdrew the grievance.
This research
revealed four (4) critical points to the Bureau. First, that incidents of this type of misconduct have dramatically
increased in the last two (2) years. This point, however, is not surprising as the vast majority of
State agencies have only recently permitted widespread Internet and
email access to virtually all employees. Second, that in the absence of a complaint, arbitrators may be
hesitant to permit immediate discharge for such conduct, favoring the
progressive discipline system instead. While this realization is notable, it is also important to bear
in mind that this point is only representative of two (2) arbitrations,
a number far too small from which to draw any real conclusions. Third, that unions and employees are not pursuing their cases
to arbitration or other litigation. Fourth, that the State is consistently implementing
an immediate discharge policy for such infractions. The Bureau was pleased to discover this fact,
as consistency in the disciplinary process is always beneficial in the
event of arbitration.
Question Two – Disciplinary Action by Private Sector
and Other Governmental Employers
Once the Bureau
had a firm grasp of how the State as an employer was disciplining for
this type of misconduct, the research then turned to how other governmental
and non-governmental entities were disciplining for this type of misconduct.
The Bureau quickly discovered the magnitude of the problem in the private
sector, especially in high level positions. For example, one Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an international
company settled out of court when it was documented that all his hits
on the Internet were pornographic sites and that he had eighty-one (81)
dirty jokes in his personal folders, classified by category.
[1]
In other cases, major corporations have paid
millions of dollars to employees who allege hostile work environment
sexual harassment in connection with this type of misconduct. Most notably:
1.
A
CEO personally paid $1.5 million to a female employee after he downloaded
pornography, showed it to her, and asked her to do the same things. A lawsuit was never filed in this situation.
[2]
2.
Chevron
Corporation paid $2.2 million to settle a lawsuit that was filed after
an email circulated within the company that listed twenty-five (25)
reasons why a beer is better than a woman.
[3]
3.
Microsoft
Corporation paid out $2.2. Million to settle a sexual harassment suit
involving pornographic messages sent within the company via email.
[4]
Due to the potential
liability, major corporations are now faced with a need to monitor their
employees’ email and Internet usage and discipline accordingly. Dow Chemical recently fired fifty (50) people
and suspended two-hundred (200) more for sending and storing email messages
with pornographic or violent content.
[5]
The New York Times and Xerox Corporation have
faced similar disciplinary situations. The research did not reveal any cases where the discharged or
disciplined employee filed a wrongful termination lawsuit or pursued
another form of alternative dispute resolution.
Even in those
private sector companies that provide employees with a procedure through
which they may challenge discipline, the cases that have been arbitrated
for this type of misconduct are few and far between. In fact, extensive research by both the Bureau and an outside
research firm revealed only two (2) private sector arbitration cases
that involved this type of misconduct. Those cases are summarized below for the reader’s convenience.
1.
In
the case of PPG Industries, Inc. (Oak Creek Wisconsin) and Brotherhood
of Painter and Allied Trades, Local 579, 113 LA 833 (1999), the
employer received a complaint from an employee stating that she had
found a sexually explicit email on the computer she shared with a coworker. This complaint prompted the employer to conduct a lengthy investigation
resulting in the issuance of a variety of disciplines including the
termination of the grievant. The
employer argued discharge was appropriate for the grievant as he, unlike
the others involved, had lied during the investigation and had intentionally
taken steps to circumvent the company’s computer blocking system. While acknowledging that the grievant misused
employer property, violated employer policies, and lied to investigators,
all of which the arbitrator viewed as serious misconduct requiring stern
measures, the grievant’s misconduct was not so much worse than the conduct
of the others that discharge was warranted. Also, the arbitrator found that one of the policies the grievant
violated had not been distributed to him. The grievant was reinstated without backpay.
2.
In
the case of Northwest Publications, Inc./Saint Paul Pioneer Press
and Newspaper Guild of the Twin Cities, Local 2, 114 LA 761 (2000),
the employer suspended the grievant for five (5) days after he brought
to work a picture of his wife showing full frontal nudity. The grievant also used company equipment to scan the picture
into the computer so that he could display it on his 17” monitor for
editing. The grievant then asked a co-worker to assist
him in the editing of the photograph and invited another to view the
picture. When one of the employees
complained, the employer investigated and ultimately suspended the employee
for five (5), citing violations of the employer’s Offensive Behavior
Policy. Arbitrator Bognanno found that the grievant
had in fact violated the policy and acted inappropriately; however,
he opined that the picture was not pornographic, and that the behavior
was just short of being offensive. The
suspension was reduced to a written reprimand and the grievant was made
whole.
This research
also turned up three (3) arbitration cases from other governmental entities. Those cases are summarized below for the reader’s
convenience.
1.
In
the case of Morrison v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), CH-0752-94-0362-I-1, United States of America Merit Systems
Protection Board (1994), the grievant received a thirty-five (35) day
suspension and reassignment for misuse of government resources and exposing
individuals in the work environment to sexually explicit material. One of the grievant’s co-workers complained after being exposed
to a sexually explicit image on the grievant’s computer. An investigation revealed over one-hundred (100)
sexually explicit images and unauthorized computer on the grievant’s
computer. The Board sustained
the discipline, noting that an agency need not wait to discipline an
employee until his/her inappropriate sexually offensive behavior becomes
so severe and pervasive that it constitutes unlawful discrimination. The Board also noted the seriousness of the
misconduct and the impact it could have on the work environment.
2.
In
the case of Independent School District 116 and Individual Grievant,
BMS case No. 98-TD-13, the grievant was discharged for using a school
computer to download pornographic images from the Internet. The grievant had previously been charged with fondling a female
student, but this incident was not reported to the School Board. At arbitration, the union argued that the employer
did not have an Internet policy restricting Internet access, that the
discipline was too severe, and that inclusion of the prior fondling
charge in this discipline was double jeopardy because the grievant received
an oral reprimand for that misconduct. Arbitrator
Sharon K. Imes found that discharge was improper
and that there was little evidence that the grievant’s downloading of
this material had the potential to harm the District, its students or
its staff.
3.
In
the case of
Finally, the
Bureau is also aware of several cases involving this type of misconduct
among city government employees. The
majority of city governments are also discharging their employees for
such misconduct. Specifically:
1.
The
city of
2.
The
city of
3.
The
city of
4.
The
city of
5.
The
city of
The above-discussed
cases are important for several reasons. First, they hint at the liability that an employer may face when
an employee accesses sexually explicit material on the Internet or forwards
a sexually explicit email. There
seems to be much more focus on how to address the effects this type
of misconduct may have on fellow employees who are exposed to the material
than on whether or not the disciplined employee will challenge the discipline. Employer liability in this type of case can
be enormous, and employers are seemingly focusing on that fact. Second, this type of misconduct is rapidly becoming
a major disciplinary issue for employers whether they are private or
public, governmental or non-governmental. These cases also provide some insight on how to better deal with
this type of misconduct and how to succeed at arbitration. For example, an Internet policy that is widely
dispersed and known among employees is critical. Third, these cases, or really the lack of cases,
also evidence the fact that employees are accepting the discipline that
they are given for this type of misconduct and retreating. The Bureau believes this acceptance evidences
an acknowledgment on the part of the employee that this type of behavior
is in fact very serious misconduct that is deserving of the penalty
of the employee receives.
Question Three – The Right of the State to Monitor Employee
Email and Internet Usage
This section will deal exclusively with the right of public employers to monitor the email and
Internet activities of its employees. Private employers and public employers typically have different
legal concerns in this area (i.e., the Fourth Amendment) which could
result in a different analysis and perhaps a different conclusion. Therefore, nothing in this section is to be
construed as applicable to the private sector, and the Bureau makes no attempt to offer any analysis on what
rights a private sector employer may or may not
have to monitor employee email and Internet usage. Lastly, this section should not be construed
as exhaustive and/or as legal advice on how to approach such a situation.
The Bureau knew
that State agencies clearly had the capacity/ability to monitor the
email and Internet activities of employees, but the question that now
needed to be examined was what legal right does the State have to monitor
this usage and are there any restrictions to this monitoring? What quickly became apparent is that the case law in this area
is also new and minimal. What
also quickly became apparent is that public employers face two (2) main
potential roadblocks when it comes to monitoring employee email and
Internet usage: Fourth Amendment privacy issues
[6]
and First Amendment free speech/expression issues
[7]
.
The first issue
that a public employer faces with the monitoring of employee email and
Internet usage is one of privacy, which implicates the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. A
public employer must balance its employees’ Constitutional rights and
reasonable expectations of privacy against its own interest in conducting
the search.
The seminal case
in this area is O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
[8]
In examining this tenuous balance in light of
the facts of the Ortega case, the Supreme Court held that public
sector workplace searches are constitutional if they are tailored to
the government’s interest in the efficient and proper operation of the
job site.
[9]
The Court also found that employee searches
and surveillance are to be examined on a case by case basis with the
totality of the circumstances considered.
[10]
The Court held that an employee’s constitutional
rights are violated only if the employee has an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
[11]
The Court went on to determine that a search
conducted by a public employer is reasonable when the employer offers
legitimate business reasons (i.e. employer’s need for supervision, control,
and efficiency in the workplace) for the search and those reasons outweigh
the employee’s protected privacy interests.
[12]
In light of this decision, public employers
generally enjoy wide latitude in searching employee work areas, including
the employee’s computer.
[13]
Usually if employees are made aware of the types
of searches that may be conducted and the areas that may be searched,
their reasonable expectation of privacy is reduced.
[14]
Interestingly,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
recently dismissed an invasion of privacy claim filed by an at-will
employee who sent email messages the employer found inappropriate, unprofessional,
and offensive.
[15]
The employer in this case had made numerous
assurances that employee email would not be monitored, read, or used
as the basis for disciplinary action.
[16]
Despite these assurances, the court found that
the employee’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable.
[17]
Next, public
employers should consider the implications of the First Amendment as
emails and Internet usage likely implicate free speech and/or expression
issues. As a general rule, public employees, when acting
in their capacity as public employees, enjoy limited free speech/expression
rights.
[18]
There are two major cases in this area: Pickering
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
[19]
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
[20]
. In
The findings
of the Court in Connick have recently come into play in the Supreme
Court of the State of
What this means
for a public employer is that there is a reasonable amount of leeway
to search employee emails and monitor Internet usage because the expectation
of privacy is lessened, and free speech protections are diminished.
Question Four –
Through reviewing
available cases and articles in preparation for this paper, four (4)
possible arguments that unions may advance in defense of such misconduct
came to light. The discussion
below about these arguments is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather
provide the reader with some ideas as to what the Bureau believes to
be the unions’ possible arguments. Following
a discussion of the unions’ arguments will be a discussion of the arguments
the Bureau either currently advances or will advance, in these types
of misconduct cases.
The first argument
the unions may advance in defense of such an allegation of misconduct
is that the accused employee merely misused State time and equipment,
which is not unlike taking too long a break or using the State provided
computer for personal business, and therefore, the discipline given
in this case is unequal or discriminatory. Under this defense, the unions’ will try very hard to de-emphasize
the content of the email message(s) and/or Internet site(s), instead
focusing on the general act of misconduct, i.e., misuse of time, misuse
of equipment. The unions may
then couple this with evidence of any and all discipline the employer
has given with regards to this type of “misconduct” (e.g., Employee
“X” took excessively long breaks and only received a written reprimand
or Employee “Y” used a State vehicle for personal use and only received
a three day suspension) that is different from the discipline this specific
employee received. Under this
argument, the unions do not dispute that the misconduct occurred, but
rather that the discipline was discriminatorily administered when compared
to other like misuse of State time and equipment.
A closely related
second argument the unions may advance is that the discipline is too
severe for the misconduct. As
is the case with the first argument, the unions again would not be arguing
that the misconduct did not occur, and likely would acknowledge that
the grievant “committed the crime.” What the unions would argue, however, is that the “punishment
did not fit the crime.” The unions would likely argue that this misconduct
is not so egregious as to warrant circumventing the progressive discipline
system and jumping straight to discharge.
The third argument
the unions may advance is that the various agency Internet/email/computer
policies do not say that immediate discharge will result for accessing/emailing
sexually explicit material but rather that discipline, up to and including
discharge, may result. The unions
would argue that the inclusion of the phrase “up to and including” and
the word “may” implies that some form of discipline other than discharge
is likely under this policy. Also, the unions would argue that failure to
clearly state that discharge will result for accessing/emailing presents
a notice problem because although employees knew discipline “may” occur
for this type of misconduct, they did not know discharge was imminent.
Lastly, the unions
may attempt to argue that the accused employee is addicted to sex, or
“surfing” the Internet, so s/he should not be held responsible for the
misconduct or should be given a second chance because s/he has been
“rehabilitated”. This argument would follow the same lines as
the “alcoholic” or “drug addict” defense when an employee is disciplined,
for example, for excessive tardiness or abuse of the sick leave policy. The unions could encourage their grievant to
seek assistance from a mental health professional and then produce evidence
of such assistance at the arbitration while arguing that the grievant
is an addict, but has sought help for which s/he should be credited,
not punished. Although the Bureau
was unable to find a single case or article where the unions or an attorney
advanced such a defense, the Bureau still believes the unions could
advance this argument in some cases. The Bureau has also consulted with the Employee Assistance Program
with regard to the possibility and viability of this argument.
The employer
is not without its valid and strong arguments in response to those advanced
by the unions. A review of the
research in this area revealed several arguments that the Bureau can
add to the arguments it already advances when faced with this type of
misconduct. The Bureau anticipates additional arguments
to surface as this area of misconduct becomes more developed through
new cases.
First, in response
to the unions’ attempts to de-emphasize the content of the emails/Internet
sites, the employer would strongly emphasize the content of the emails/Internet
sites. The sexually explicit
content of the emails/Internet sites is extremely important because
it is this fact that separates this type of misuse from any other type
of misuse for two reasons. One,
the sexually explicit nature of the emails/Internet sites opens the
employer up to enormous legal liability, as discussed above. The employer could face complaints and lawsuits from co-workers,
the public, and clients. The
employer has the right to protect itself from this potential liability. As discussed above, there are cases that an employer can turn
to that discuss this argument and the fact that an employer need not
wait until the introduction of sexually explicit material into the workplace
constitutes illegal harassment before it takes action. This liability could also extend to exposing Information Technology
people to sexually explicit material when the employer must ask them
to monitor, investigate, or retrieve sensitive documents from an accused
employee’s computer. Two, the
employer’s reputation and public image are at stake if a client or member
of the public were to accidentally be exposed to the sexually explicit
materials. The employer has the right to protect that reputation
and image. If a member of the
public or a client were to be accidentally exposed, the employer could
suffer paralyzing consequences through loss of business, loss of respect/trust,
embarrassment, and public scrutiny. This risk is even higher for the State because as public entities,
they are accountable to the taxpayers.
In response to
arguments that the “punishment does not fit the crime,” the employer
would again need to focus on the content of the emails/Internet sites
and argue that this is exactly the type of conduct that is so egregious,
so offensive, and so legally charged that the employer has no choice
but to circumvent the progressive discipline process and immediately
discharge. The employer may also buttress this argument with evidence
of previous situations where an employee was discharged for this type
of misconduct. This is one of
the reasons why it is important for the employer to consistently discharge
employees for this type of misconduct. It will be more difficult to succeed on this
argument if the employer has administered discipline that is less than
discharge.
Third, the employer
will want to tie together all policies the accused employee violated
to fortify the discharge. For
example, if Employee “A” forwards a sexually explicit joke to Employee
“B” and Employee “B” is offended so s/he complains, Employee “A” may
have violated the employer’s sexual harassment policy in addition to
violating computer/email policies (telling the joke verbally and emailing
the joke are equivalent behaviors). If one couples these policy violations with
misuse of State time and resources and suddenly the employer has a whole
host of reasons why discharge, as opposed to progressive discipline,
is warranted. All of these policies
contain may language that violations are serious and discharge could
result, so the employer would need to argue that a reasonable person
should have known that multiple violations could lead to discharge.
Finally, the
addiction argument is slightly more problematic for the employer. There are no known cases where this defense
has been asserted so it makes the success of such an argument by the
unions all the more elusive. In
the absence of any precedent, the employer would likely advance the
same arguments it advances in drug and alcohol addiction cases with
the possible caveat that this type of addiction has not yet been recognized
as a justification for misconduct in the employment setting. The Bureau could also argue that this type of behavior is a compulsion,
not an illness, which cannot justify the misconduct anymore than a compulsive
liar could justify falsification of documents because of his/her compulsive
behavior.
Question Five – Related Issues of the Future
There are two
(2) main issues that the Bureau expects to encounter in the future that
are related to email and Internet access. The first issue presents a liability of depths not yet known. The Minnesota Human Rights Act
[32]
defines twelve (12) protected traits.
[33]
Each State agency with twenty-five (25) or more
employees is required to have a policy prohibiting harassment and/or
discrimination based on any of these protected traits in the employment
arena and a complaint procedure that is designed to handle complaints
of this nature.
[34]
Theoretically, an employer could be liable for
an employee’s accessing any Internet site or sending any email that
is derogatory to any of the listed traits. For example, most employees know that if they were to bring in
posters and/or tell jokes that are demeaning of one’s sexual orientation,
they may face harassment allegations by an offended co-employee. The
fact that the employee “tells” (sends) the jokes or “shares” the pictures
through email is irrelevant as the liability for the employer still
exists, as does the possibility of harassment allegations against the
offending employee. It is important to keep in mind that it is the
impact the content of the message has on an “exposed” employee that
is relevant, not the mode through which that message is shared. As hate organizations increase their Internet
activities, the Bureau expects this issue to quickly enter the employment
area
[35]
.
The second pre-eminent
issue is the fact that some employees spend an excessive amount of time
on innocuous or non-business related Internet sites. While a co-worker or member of the public may
not be offended, and there may be no legal liability for the employer,
when an employee reads USA Today on-line or visiting the Sports Illustrated
website for news/sports updates, there is still a detriment to the employer
in three regards. First, there
is misuse of State time and equipment issues. The employer has supplied access to the Internet and email systems
in an effort to make employees more efficient and increase their ability
to do their jobs. While incidental personal use of these resources
may pose little problem, excessive use violates established policies,
taxes the system, and wastes public money. Second, if employees are spending excessive amounts of time on
non-business related Internet sites, they likely are not doing their
jobs, and may result in overtime. This
type of activity potentially places an enormous financial burden on
the employer. Third, this type of excessive Internet/email
use for personal reasons may affect employee or work group morale, causing
complaints from within the work group that the accused employee is no
longer contributing to the work group because of time spent on the Internet
or personal emails.
Question Six – Recommendations
1.
Notify
employees of the employer’s right and intention to monitor employee
email and Internet usage.
2.
Make
it clear that an employee should have no expectation of privacy with
regard to any information on a computer system owned and controlled
by the employer.
3.
Review
existing computer/email/Internet policies and clarify the intent and
expectations of the policies. Make
sure policies contain prohibitions against accessing and emailing sexually
explicit materials, entering chat rooms, bulletin boards, etc.
4.
Make
it clear that the employer will not tolerate defamatory, discriminatory,
or threatening email.
5.
Consider
adding language to computer policies that states email and Internet
communications must be professional and respectful.
6.
Cross-reference
computer policies and discriminatory harassment policies.
7.
Consider
including immediate discharge and “zero tolerance” language in computer
policies for certain violations such as accessing/sending sexually explicit,
harassing, or defamatory materials.
8.
Consider
re-issuing computer/email/Internet policies, highlighting portions of
the policy at staff meetings, and/or adding a pop-up box every time
an employee logs into the system.
Conclusion
While this paper
is intended to provide the reader with information on the current state
of this up and coming type of misconduct, it is not intended to be exhaustive. The Bureau suggests that readers review their
agency’s existing Internet and email policies. When reviewing the policies, check to see if the policy contains
“discipline, up to and including discharge” language. If it does, the Bureau strongly encourages removing
such language. Instead, consider
language that clearly states accessing sexually explicit Internet sites
or sending and/or maintaining sexually explicit emails will not be tolerated,
and that violations of this prohibition are grounds for immediate discharge. It may also be appropriate to include similar language for accessing
offensive, obscene, or “hate” Internet sites or sending and/or maintaining
emails of a similar content. Lastly, the Bureau encourages the Human Resources
community to work closely with their account representative at the Bureau,
as that individual can be a valuable resource when faced with such an
issue in the workplace.
[1]
“Inappropriate Internet Surfing”, IndustryWeek
Magazine. Available at http://www.humanlinks.com/manres/ethics1.htm
[2]
Id
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id.
[5]
“Dow Chemical Fires 50, suspends 200 For Sending
and Storing Offensive Email,” Human Resources Report, Bureau
of National Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 31, page 849 (8/7/00).
[6]
“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments.html.
[7]
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” U.S. Const.
Amend. I. Available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments.html.
[8]
This case involved the privacy claim of a doctor
that arose out of a state hospital official’s search of the office,
desk, and file cabinet of a physician suspected of mismanaging the
hospital residency program. O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 712 – 713. The
desk contained some personal information, records, and gifts. Id. at 718.
[9]
“Electronic Interaction in the Workplace: Monitoring,
Retrieving and Storing Employee Communications in the Internet Age,”
Mark S. Dichter and Michael S. Burkhardt. Available at http://www.morganlewis.com/art61499.htm.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
See generally The United States v. Mark L. Simons,
29 F.Supp.2d 324 (E.D.Va. 1998) and Williams v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 826 F.Supp.952 (E.D.Pa. 1993). Id.
[14]
Id.
[15]
See generally Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914
F.Supp. 97 (E.D.Pa. 1996)
[16]
Id. at 98
[17]
Id. at 101
[18]
See generally Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
[19]
This case involved a teacher who was discharged
for writing and publishing in the local newspaper a letter criticizing
the School Boards’ allocation of school funds. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
[20]
This case involved an attorney who was discharged
for expressing her strong opposition to transfer to a different division
of the District Attorney’s office to numerous supervisors and for
ultimately refusing the transfer. The Respondent also prepared a questionnaire that she distributed
to co-workers soliciting their opinions on a number of office issues
including the transfer. Connick,
461 U.S. at 140.
[21]
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
[22]
“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.” Id. at 569.
[23]
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id. at 147.
[26]
Id. at 152.
[27]
See V.A. Code Ann. §2.1-804-806 (Mickie
Supp. 1998).
[28]
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1998). Available at http://www.law.emory.edu/4circuit/feb99/981481.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id.